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The Crumbling of the Wills Act:
The Australians Point the Way
John H. Langbein*
On
November 29th of 1978, a probate court sitting
in the Australian city of Adelaide issued a
judgment that is likely in time to stand as a great
milestone in the progress of probate law in the
United States and the rest of the common law world.
The Australian court admitted to probate and
thereby enforced a will that was conceded to have
been executed in partial violation of the formal re­
quirements of the local Wills Act. For the first time
in the common law world, a court excused a testa­
tor's failure to comply strictly with the Wills Act
formalities. A "substantial compliance" or "harmless
error" doctrine had finally been recognized and
applied.
The present article outlines the background of this
development and points to its large implications for
American probate practice.
The Wills Act
Every Anglo-American jurisdiction has a so-called
Wills Act that prescribes the formalities for making
a valid will. These statutes have a common core
that traces back to English models-the wills provi­
sions of the Statute of Frauds of 1677 and the Wills
Act of 1837. This received English tradition recog­
nizes only one mode of testation, the attested (some­
times called the formal or witnessed) will. Its es­
sentials are writing, signature and attestation. The
terms of the will must be in writing, the testator
must sign the will, and two (sometimes three) wit­
nesses must attest to the testator's signature. A vari­
ety of other formal requirements can be found in the
Wills Acts of the various jurisdictions: rules govern-
• Professor of Law. A substantially similar version of this
article appears in the August, 1979, issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. Reprinted with permission.
ing the acknowledgment of a signature already in
place, rules calling for the testator and the witnesses
to sign in each other's presence, requirements about
the positioning of signature, and many more. (For
a fairly recent compilation of the details, see Rees,
"American Wills Statutes," 46 Virginia Law Reuieui
613, 856 (1960).)
An alternative formal system for holographic wills
is permitted to testators in twenty-odd American
jurisdictions, mostly those in the Western states
where Spanish law has been influential, but including
Pennsylvania, Virginia and now (through the me­
dium of the newly enacted Uniform Probate Code)
Michigan as well. Holograph statutes allow the testa­
tor in effect to substitute handwriting for attestation.
He may execute his will without witnesses, but it
must be "entirely" (or in some states "materially")
in his handwriting.
Strict Compliance
These formal requirements are not difficult to com­
ply with, and one of the basic responsibilities of
conscientious lawyer-draftsmen is to supervise execu­
tion ceremonies in order to ensure compliance. In
general, the bar discharges this responsibility well,
so that execution blunders occur relatively rarely in
the lawyer-served end of the estate planning spec­
trum. Not so for homedrawn wills, however. Lay­
men ignorant of the existence or true import of the
formal requirements of the Wills Act have left be­
hind them a staggering legacy of noncomplying in­
struments, frustrated estate plans, aggravated probate
expenses, and commensurate human misery.
In dealing with these botched wills, Anglo-Ameri­
can courts have produced one of the cruelest chap­
ters that survives in the common law. Purely tech­
nical violations that could in no way cast doubt
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upon the authenticity or finality of wills are held
to invalidate the offending instrument.
A typical illustration, currently reproduced in one
of the leading American law school casebooks, is the
decision of Sir Jocelyn Simon in the English case
of Re Groiiman, (1969) 1 W.L.R. 733 (Ct. Ap,
1968). Each of the two witnesses, who were attend­
ing a social gathering at the testator's home, affixed
his signature while the other was in the next room.
The will was held invalid for violation of the re­
quirement that the witnesses sign in the presence of
each other, although the judge forthrightly declared:
"I am perfectly satisfied that the document was in­
tended by the deceased to be executed as his will
and that its contents represent his testamentary
intentions."
Because this rule of strict compliance with the
Wills Act formalities produces results so harsh, sym­
pathetic courts have been inclined to squirm. The
law reports bulge with a vast, hopelessly contradic­
tory case law on questions such as whether a gesture
or a grunt constituted a testator's acknowledgment
of signature. (See Annotation, 7 A.L.R. 3d 317
( 1966).) Courts have thus enabled themselves to find
literal compliance in cases that in fact instance de­
fective compliance. In the leading case of Re Horn­
by, (1946) P. 171, interpreting the requirement of
the English statute that the testator's signature be
"at the end" of the will, the court concluded that
a signature in the middle of the instrument was ac­
tually at the end because the testator "thought it
would be more convenient to have his signature" in
the middle.
It is very hard to predict when the equities of par­
ticular cases will inspire particular courts to indulge
in these evasions. 'Hence, the strict compliance rule­
although meant to promote certainty in testamenta­
tion-breeds litigation on account of the unpredict­
ability about when and how the courts will apply
it. The rule has achieved what is in many respects
the worst of both worlds. It produces results of un­
exampled harshness when it is enforced, and it fre­
quently leads the courts to dishonesty and caprice
when it is not.
Reform Efforts Commence
Not surprisingly, this state of affairs has provoked
discontent. Recent law school casebooks in the field
have prodded students to ask whether the purposes
of the Wills Act really compel the results inflicted
under the rule of literal compliance. The Uniform
Probate Code of 1969 has made a contribution to­
wards reducing the dimensions of the problem (in
those states that have enacted the Code) by reducing
the number and complexity of Wills Act formalities,
so that laymen have less to get wrong. Signature
and attestation are still required, but the rules about
placement of signature and presence of witnesses
have been abolished.
Finally, the rule of literal compliance came under
direct attack. Within a period of a few months in
1974-1975, literature appeared in England, Australia
and the United States calling for the development
of a purposive standard for evaluating defectively
executed wills.
The first article was provoked by Re Beadle,
(1974) All E.R. 493, another of the endless series
of irreconcilable cases applying the requirement that
the signature be "at the end." The testatrix had
signed her will at the top and again on the envelope
into which she sealed it. The court "regretfully"
declared the will invalid. The judge candidly ob­
served that there was no possibility of anything
having been altered after the envelope had been
sealed and put away, and that there was "no doubt
at all that the paper contains what she wanted....
"
Commenting on Re Beadle in a leading practition­
ers' journal, G.M. Bates of Birmingham University
juxtaposed the case with Re Hornby and wondered
why, if a signature placed halfway down a will could
satisfy the statutory requirement, a signature at the
top could not. That sort of critique was hardly novel,
sound though it was. But Bates went further, arguing
that the strict compliance rule itself was misguided.
He suggested that "if one or more of the [Wills Act]
formalities is not observed, then the court should
nevertheless give effect to the true intentions of the
testator as expressed in the document, in the absence
of suspicious circumstances" (Bates, "A Case for In­
tention," 124 New Law Journal 380, 382 (1974».
Five months after Bates' article appeared, the of­
ficial Law Reform Committee of the state of South
Australia took up the theme (without knowledge of
the Bates' article) as an incidental topic in a report
to the Attorney General dealing mainly with the
projected overhaul of the state's intestacy laws. The
Committee remarked that the number of intestate
estates could be reduced if the courts were empow­
ered to validate wills despite mechanical execution
defects. "It would seem to us that in all cases where
there is a technical failure to comply with the Wills
Act, there should be a power given to the Court or
a Judge to declare that the will in question is a good
and. valid testamentary document if he is satisfied
that the document does in fact represent the last will
and testament of the testator ..." (Twenty-eighth
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Report of the Law Reform Committee of South
Australia to the Attorney General (1974), p. 10).
The Substantial Compliance Doctrine
These English and Australian developments occurred
while an article of mine setting forth a doctrinal
basis for more discerning enforcement of the Wills
Act was in press. My position was summed up in the
title: there should be a rule of "Substantial Com­
pliance with the Wills Act" ( 88 Harvard Law Re­
view 489 (1975» that would permit the proponents
of a defectively executed will to prove that the par­
ticular defect was harmless to the purposes of the
Wills Act. Drawing on a rich literature devoted to
identifying the functions of the Wills Act formali­
ties, I made the following points:
( 1) The Wills Act is meant to assure the imple­
mentation of the decedent's testamentary intention
at a time, when by definition, he can no longer be
on hand to express himself. The requirement of
written terms forces the testator to leave permanent
evidence of the substance of his wishes. Signature
and attestation provide evidence of the genuineness
of the instrument, and they caution the testator
about the seriousness and finality of his act. The
attestation ceremony also has a protective function:
disinterested observers are supposed to prevent
crooks from deceiving or coercing the testator into
making a disposition that does not represent his true
intentions. Taken together, these evidentiary, cau­
tionary and protective functions serve another end,
the channeling function: when the formalities are
complied with, they routinize testation, eliminate
contest, reduce probate costs and court time, and
facilitate good estate planning.
(2) When, however, there has been a mechanical
blunder, it docs not follow that the purposes of the
Wills Act have been disserved. Thus, for example,
if the statute calls for signature "at the end" in
order to prevent subsequent interpolation, it does
not follow that in every case of misplaced signature
such an event has occurred.
(3) Accordingly, we could obtain all of the bene­
fits of the Wills Act formal system and yet avoid
so much of the hardship if the presumption of in­
validity applied to defectively executed wills were
reduced from a conclusive to a rebuttable one. The
proponents of a defectively executed will should be
allowed to prove what they are now entitled to pre­
sume in cases of due execution-that the will in
question expresses the decedent's true testamentary
intent. They should be allowed to prove that the
defect is harmless to the purpose of the formality.
In the example just given of misplaced signature, the
proponents would bear the burden of proving (on
an ordinary preponderance-of-proof standard) that
subsequent interpolation had not occurred.
(4) Although the substantial compliance rule is a
litigation doctrine, it should not be feared as a po­
tential litigation-breeder. Precisely because it is a
litigation rule, it would have no place in professional
estate planning. Nor would the substantial compli­
ance doctrine attract the reliance of amateurs. Every
incentive for due execution would remain, for no
testator sets out to throw his estate into litigation.
Other factors would operate to diminish the in­
cidence and the difficulty of the litigation that would
arise under the substantial compliance rule. By no
means would every defectively executed instrument
result in a contest. On many issues, the proponents'
burden of proof would be so onerous that they
would forego the trouble and expense of hopeless
litigation; and on certain other issues, the proponents'
burden would be so easy to discharge that potential
contestants would not bother to litigate. Evidentiary
and cautionary formalities like signature and writing
are all but indispensable, whereas omitted protective
formalities like the simultaneous presence of attesting
witnesses are easily shown to have been needless in
the particular case.
Indeed, it seems plausible that the substantial com­
pliance doctrine might actually decrease the levels
of probate litigation. In numerous situations such as
the "at-the-end" cases we have discussed above, the
literal compliance rule has produced a large and
contradictory case law. The courts now purport to
ask in these cases: did the particular conduct con­
stitute literal compliance with the formality? The
substantial compliance doctrine would replace that
awkward, formalistic question with a more manage­
able question: did the conduct serve the purpose of
the formality? By substituting a purposive analysis
for a formal one, the substantial compliance doctrine
would make the standard more predictable, and con­
testants would lose their present incentive to prove
up harmless defects.
'
(5) An equivalent substantial compliance doctrine
has been working smoothly for decades in the func­
tionally identical sphere of the major will substitute,
life insurance, in those situations where there are
technical violations of the testament like formalities
for change-of-beneficiary designations. (See Annota­
tion, 19 A.L.R. 2d 5 (1951).)
Breakthrough in South Australia
In November, 1975, the state of South Australia
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enacted a substantial compliance doctrine patterned
on the recommendation of the state Law Reform
Committee discussed above. Section 9 of the Wills
Act Amendment Act (No.2), which came into ef­
fect in january, 1976, amends the South Australian
Wills Act to provide:
A document purporting to embody the testa­
mentary intentions of a deceased person shall,
notwithstanding that it has not been executed
with the formalities required by this Act, be
deemed to be a will of the deceased person if
the Supreme Court (which is the first instance
court), upon application for admission of the
document to probate as the last will of the de­
ceased, is satisfied that there can be no reason­
able doubt that the deceased intended the docu­
ment to constitute his will.
By enacting this extremely liberal provision, the
South Australian parliament determined to put to
the test of actual experience all the hoary justifica­
tions for the rule of strict compliance. Experience
rather than conjecture would now decide whether
the strict compliance rule had been an essential bul­
wark against legions of schemers ready to coerce
and defraud enfeebled testators; experience would
now disclose whether decedents' estates would be
engulfed in floodtides of litigation.
The Graham Case
Now that the proverbial floodgates have been left
open for three years, only a single case has thus far
arisen under the new law, Re Graham, decided on
November 29, 1978, and not yet published in the
reports (Action No. T.C.j. 38/78, judgment No.
4090 of the Supreme Court of South Australia, per
Jacobs, J.). Accordingly, the first important lesson
of the South Australian experiment appears to be-as
proponents of the substantial compliance doctrine
predicted-that the probate process functions quite
well without the strict compliance rule. Conceivably,
future caseloads might mount as potential schemers
and contestants explore their new license, but the
experience to date certainly is to the contrary.
The opinion in the Graham case gives further
cause for confidence that the courts will not find it
difficult to strike the right balance between flexible
treatment of formal defects on the one hand and the
need for strong evidence of testamentary intent on
the other. The facts of the case may be easily stated.
An elderly testatrix handed her will to her nephew
with her signature already in place and asked him
"to get it witnessed." He took it to two neighboring
housewives, who signed as "witnesses," although
neither had actually seen the testatrix sign as the
Wills Act requires. The nephew then returned the
will to the testatrix. (In the subsequent probate pro­
ceedings upon the defectively executed instrument,
the testatrix' signature was independently verified.)
The judge concluded that "upon these facts, I
have not the slightest doubt that the deceased in­
tended the document which is before me to con­
stitute her will." Although not wishing to lay down
broad dictum about the new statutory substantial
compliance doctrine, the court emphasized the stat­
ute's "requirement that the Court should be 'satisfied
that there can be no reasonable doubt that the de­
ceased intended the document to constitute his will' "
(emphasis original). The court then remarked "that
in most cases, the greater the departure from the
requirements of formal validity dictated by" the
Wills Act, "the harder will it be for the Court to
reach the desired state of satisfaction." This reading
of the statutory language is very close to the burden­
shifting rule that was envisaged in the scholarly lit­
erature preceding the South Australian statute, where
it has been urged that the proponents of the will
should bear the burden of proving that the particular
execution defect is harmless to the purposes of the
Wills Act.
Is Statute Needed?
The South Australian experience is likely to put to
rest any remaining doubts about the wisdom of the
substantial compliance approach. The large issue that
is still unresolved in current discussions is whether,
in states whose legislatures have not taken up the
question, the courts should be free to adopt the sub­
stantial compliance solution without statute.
It is conceded on all sides that a legislature could
forbid substantial compliance and insist on a literal
compliance rule if it wished. I have taken the posi­
tion that the existing literal compliance rule is a
judicial creation and that the courts can abandon
it when experience and reflection reveal that its harsh
results are not essential to the good order of the
probate system (88 Harvard Law Review at 530-31).
The substantial compliance doctrine would do little
more than bring the Wills Act into parity with the
Statute of Frauds, where the judicially-developed
part performance and main purpose rules apply a
functional standard to the formalities for contract
and conveyance.
Particularly in those American jurisdictions where
the legislatures have authorized holographic wills, it
seems appropriate to ask courts to take a fresh look
at the substantial compliance question. The legisla­
tures in these states have authorized in the holograph
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a type of testation that completely dispenses with
the protective policy that is the dominant concern
of so many of the formalities for attested wills.
When, therefore, a testator attempts to make an
attested will but blunders, he will still have achieved
a level of formality that compares favorably with
that permitted for a holographic will in the same
state.
In an age when the expansive requirements of
public law tend ever more to crowd private law
matters from the legislative agenda, it is unrealistic
to pretend that the legislatures should correct the
courts' mistake in the interpretation of the Wills
Act. Substantial compliance is the proper work of
the courts, and it is also the new responsibility and
opportunity of the probate bar to raise the issue on
behalf of the intended beneficiaries of blemished
wills. •
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Speech to Graduating Class of
The University of Chicago Law School
Paul Bator*
I
had hoped to be able to start with the salutation,
"Dean Casper, ex-Dean Levi, ex-Dean Neal, ex­
Dean Morris," but not all of them are here. I had
hoped to do so to underline what seems to me to
be one of the distinct charms of this wonderful
school: the fact that there is such a covey of retired,
if not deposed, monarchs around who continue to
participate happily and uncensoriously in the life of
the place. It is a little like the days when the British
had numerous Queen Mothers around all at the same
time; it adds great class.
As a visiting country cousin, I am especially grate­
ful for being allowed to participate in this family
celebration, and by way of singing for my supper,
to be allowed to say a few words. I stress, by the
way, the privilege of being allowed to eat as well
as to perform. I contrast my situation with that of
the great violinist, Kreisler, who was engaged by a
New York dowager to play for a reception she was
giving in her niansion. She asked Kreisler what his
fee would be. "One thousand dollars," he said. "That
is satisfactory," she said.vThen she added, "You do
understand, Mr. Kreisler, that when the time comes
for supper, you are to eat with the servants down­
stairs." "Oh," said Kreisler, "in that event, my fee
is only $500."
What I want to do, boldly, is to tell you about
yourselves. Gibbons said that Corsica is easier to
deplore than to describe. I am here not to deplore,
and though it is hard, I want to describe how the
University of Chicago Law School appears to a
friendly visitor.
• Visiting Professor during the 1978-1979 academic year, Mr.
Bator has returned to teaching at Harvard Law School.
This speech was given at the annual Third Year Dinner,
May 21, 1979.
Last October, on the first day of classes, I was
walking across the Green Lounge and encountered
the former Dean, Norval Morris. (By the way, that
was the day during which, also in the Green Lounge,
struggling to get out of one of its accursed doors,
Mr. Fried came up to me, put his arm paternally
around me, led me out, and then looked at me and
asked, "Are you here to interview?") Norval asked
how things were going, and I told him that I was
about to teach my first class at the University of
Chicago Law School. I added, "I am very nervous;
you know I am really in awe of teaching here."
Norval looked a bit surprised. I think he was more
surprised at my having avowed such a thought than
at the fact of the matter. But I have, since then, re­
flected about why I was, why I still am, in awe of
this institution. After all, I have taught for almost
20 years at the Harvard Law School, itself a great
and splendid place. Indeed, I understand that it is
widely felt that Harvard Law School people have
such an exalted view of themselves that they would
not be put in awe by Paradise itself.
Perhaps I can explain my feeling by a musical
parallel. Teaching at the Harvard Law School seems
to me to be a little like being allowed to sing Wagner
at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York; but
teaching law at Chicago is like singing Wagner at
Bayreuth.
Now I do not by that remark mean to put you in
mind of Shaw's gibe, that the Bayreuth artists excel
in the art of making five minutes seem like twenty.
My image is meant to convey that what really dis­
tinguishes Chicago from all the other great law
schools is not so much the matters conventionally
referred to-for instance, the close connectiori of the
law school with the rest of the university; that is
splendid and significant, but no longer unique-but
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rather, a more intangible matter. What I refer to is
the special sense felt and conveyed here that the
enterprise is a noble and elevated one, that the uni­
versity study of law should be carried out with puri­
ty and integrity, that this study involves a vocation
which needs no apology or explanation, and that it
has within it the intellectual depth and aesthetic ele­
gance which befits it to be an ornament within the
university.
I appreciate that I risk making some of the students
here a trifle impatient. In your present state of mind,
near the end of a seemingly endless educational
process, most of you will not be much moved by
talk about the nobility of the enterprise; you will be
more in the mood of Mark Twain, who you re­
member said, "Education is not as sudden as a mas­
sacre; but it is more deadly in the long run." Nev­
ertheless, I venture a prediction: in the long run,
what you will remember with most pride about
your time here is that you belonged to a great and
proud institution which seemed actually to know
what it is doing, one devoted to an ideal vision of
what the university study of law should be like and
with the courage to adhere to that vision with
fidelity.
I turn to another matter. I had expected to find,
and did find, a school that evokes awe. I did not
foresee the extent to which we would find a school
within whose faculty and within whose student body
life is enriched and sweetened by bonds of com­
munity, warmth, and welcoming friendship.
You will have remarked that I said, "within the
faculty and within the student body." Between these
two groups a certain reserve subsists, here as else­
where, though Chicago is certainly a far cry from
those not too distant days at Harvard when one of
my colleagues remarked that student-faculty rela­
tions had become a literal enactment of Oscar
Wilde's famous description of the English fox hunt:
The Unspeakable in full cry after the Uneatable.
Let me say this to the faculty: the most precious
gift you have here is that underneath the many and
sharp differences of opinion, robustly expressed (I
did not know what robust disagreement meant until
I saw Richard Epstein descend on the Posner-Landes
workshop in law and economics week after week
like an avenging fury, ready to expose ideological
sin) there exists a commitment to collegiality and
a sensitivity to what that requires and entails that
is unique among the law schools with which I am
familiar.
Similarly, a word to the students: a most striking
and remarkable thing about Chicago is the sense of
solidarity and fellowship one feels among the stu­
dents. This sense is, I think, immeasurably aided by
two lucky factors, your size and your architecture,
especially the availability of the Green Lounge as a
center for conviviality and interaction.
Let me just add (and I know I speak for all the
visitors) that we are immeasurably grateful and
deeply touched by the generosity of feeling with
which we have been received by both the faculty
and students of the school.
I want to conclude by remembering that this is
a graduation dinner, and that it is therefore appro­
priate to dish up some advice. I have some advice I
can label conventional. Remember not to be like
Prime Minister Gladstone, about whom it was said
that his conscience is his accomplice rather than his
guide (but remember, too, that Gladstone was a
very great man). Do not either be like that other
19th century prime minister, Lord Derby, about
whom it was said that his lordship is like a feather
pillow: he assumes the shape of the last ass which
sat on him (but remember, too, that Lord Derby
was a most generous politician). Do not emulate
Tallulah Bankhead, about whom Dorothy Parker
said, "A day away from Tallulah is like a month in
the country" (but remember that Tallulah was the
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most entrancing of women). As lawyers, you will
do a lot of writing; be careful not to write a book
that "fills a well-deserved gap in the literature," or
about which it will be said that it is "well done but
not worth doing." Follow Belloe, who wrote:
"When I am dead, I hope it may be said. his sins
were scarlet but his books were read." Remember
to be virtuous, but be careful about being saintly,
lest you end up like King Henry VI, who is de­
scribed in 1066 And All That as follows:
Henry VI: A Very Small King
The next king, Henry VI, was only one year
old and was thus a rather weak king. Indeed the
Barons declared he was quite numb and vague.
When he grew up, however, he was considered
a saint, or alternatively, an imbecile.
I now turn to my less conventional, perhaps even
subversive advice, which is drawn from a theological
theme. As I thought yesterday about what to say
to young lawyers about to enter the profession,
there came into my head-and maybe this just proves
that my year here has made me go completely crazy
-a recollection of the old theological quarrel about
the question whether salvation is won by good works
or by the gift of grace. Now, tonight, when I speak
about salvation, I mean salvation in this world, not
the next, and I feel free to give all these terms­
salvation, grace, works-my own definition.
I start with the proposition that, as between works
and grace, most lawyers are drawn to the life of
works. The fulfillment, satisfaction, and happiness
we count as salvation comes, we think, from the life
of energetic and beneficent action. Lawyers by na­
ture seek a world of movement and effort. We want
to do things, and salvation lies in doing good things;
we want to have an impact, and virtue lies in im­
proving the world. That is why we are exhilarated
by the use of power and enjoy its material and
psychic rewards.
This is, I stress, as it should be. It is natural and
right that you should try to do high deeds. You are
called to improve the world; you will find satisfac­
tion in work and works.
The advice I have is only this: leave a little chink
in your lives for grace. By grace I mean a number
of things, but primarily the cultivation of the inner
private virtues. I mean the willingness and ability
occasionally to be still and inactive, to allow scope
for the unheroic and the personal. Amidst the good
works, take the time and energy to be a loving
spouse, a devoted friend, an enchanted and enchant­
ing parent. Don't be totally prosaic; don't exclude
from your life completely the nonlegal, the anti­
legal, the subversive spirit of poetry. Don't forget
Shelley's words, that poets are the unacknowledged
legislators of the world. Listen with a small part of
you to one of my favorite poems, an early poem by
Ezra Pound. It is called An Inrmorality , and as an
ex-Hungarian, I have always related to it with special
warmth:
Sing we for love and idleness,
Naught else is worth the having.
Though I have been in many a land,
There is naught else in living.
And I would rather have my sweet,
Though rose leaves die of grieving,
Than do high deeds in Hungary
To pass all men's believing.
Good luck and good cheer to the University of
Chicago Law School family. •
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The Chicago Lake Front and A. Montgomery Ward
Allison Dunham*
In the years since the first publication of this article,
many changes in peoples' attitudes toward conserva­
tion of land have occurred. The fight to preserue
open spaces and historic landmarks is now an ac-
ceptable one.
.
However, I have made it impossible to determine
scientifically whether publication of this article alone
has had influence on law development because I have
been active in legal organizations which have also
been active. Thus, it would be hard to claim a causal
relationship between publication of this article and
the decision of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to draft uniform legislation concerning agree­
ments by landowners about historic preservation and
conservation agreements.
I have had such long association with the National
Conference in so many different capacities that .not
even I can assert with confidence a causal relation­
ship between conservation and legislative action. Un­
fortunately, I cannot assert the absence of a causal
relationship as any meaning either. I wrote the article
to demonstrate how a single property owner could
use a private agreement concerning private property
for the public good without an elaborate supervisory
superstructure to administer it.
A glance at the index to legal periodicals under
the heading "Environmental Law" and "Natural Re­
sources Law" appalls me when I compare the number
of articles with the meager list under "Real Property;
Covenant." The law of agreements respecting private
property does not seem to provoke as much zeal
as regulatory law.
I may be forced back on the response of an as-
• Arnold I. Shure Professor Emeritus of Urban Law. This
article was previously published in Preservation of Open
Space Areas (Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago)
1966, as an appendix. Reprinted with permission.
tronomer studying the Milky Way to a question
about why he studied it. To paraphrase: "I studied
Grant Park because it was there. I studied private
agreements involving Montgomery l-Vard not because
of the man, but because of the existence of private
agreement." Fortunately, the law respecting the use
of land remains substantially unchanged as to the
power of private landowners to control the future
use of land.
Few
visitors to the commercial center of Chicago,
known as the "Loop," realize that the present
beauty and openness of the lake front park between
the Loop and Lake Michigan is due to a right of
private property in this park which A. Montgom­
ery Ward, founder of the mail-order house, had
from about 1887 until his death in 1913. The con­
tinuation of proposals for use of this park, called
Grant Park, for buildings would indicate that the
future openness of the area may depend on t�e
present owners' exercise of this same right of PrI­
vate property, which Montgomery Ward estab­
lished in a bitter legal feud. For it was only by
asserting in court, four times between 1890 and
1911, this private right peculiar to certain property
owners that A. Montgomery Ward, "watchdog of
the lake front" as he was called, stopped the city
from filling the park with public buildings.
Chicazo's lake front, since the founding of the
city in the 1830's, has been a viv�d example of Ale�s
de Tocqueville's acute observation that our Ameri­
can democracy and constitution seem to turn po­
litical issues into legal controversies. Since the first
case in the United States Supreme Court involving
the lake front in 1839, only two years after Chicago
became a city, there has been in the courts in each
decade at least one case involving some part of the
lake shore. So bitter has been this one hundred and
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thirty-five years of feuding concerning use of the
Chicago lake front that most of the more prominent
lawyers in Chicago, and many of the prominent
lawyers in the United States, have at one time or
other held briefs in the lake front litigation. Francis
Scott Key, author of "The Star-Spangled Banner,"
Daniel Webster, Chief Justice Melville Fuller of
the United States Supreme Court, Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, Stephen Gregory, a past presi­
dent of the American Bar Association, and an at­
torney for Eugene Debs, are only a few of the
prominent lawyers who have participated in this
controversy. So much were these controversies
based on historical facts that the Chicago Tribune
wryly complained in 1910 that the files of the Chi­
cago Historical Society concerning the lake front
were so much in use by the numerous lawyers liti­
gating the lake front that they were unavailable for
professional historians.
The lake front of Chicago was not a pretty
sight in 1890 when Montgomery Ward began his
legal campaign. An article in Harper's Weekly in
1892 described it as an area in which you could
see "the flagstaffs of an armory and the quarters
of a battery of militia, and kin of these, coming
south, are the ruins and debris of a once powerful
building of iron and glass in which a national con­
vention and exhibitions galore had been held, to
wit the Exposition Building." The tracks of the
Illinois Central Railroad at this time formed the
eastern or lakeside boundary of the "park." Other
contemporaneous observers saw squalid collections
of livery stables, squatters' shacks, and mountains of
cans, ashes, and garbage, which the city dumped
there to await transfer to railroad cars. The author
of the Harper's Weekly article associated these with
railroading and concluded that it was impossible to
decide whether "the railroad or the sleepers in the
park make up the most disagreeable aspect of the
lake front." On the western side of Michigan Avenue,
where Ward's building was located, commercialism
was rapidly closing in on the residential character
of the street. As the Harper's Weekly article de­
scribed it, only at the southern or Roosevelt Road
end of the park, was Michigan Avenue the "fashion­
able boulevard of the wealthy south side."
The only newspaper attention paid to Montgom­
ery Ward's first law suit against the City of Chi­
cago, filed on October 16, 1890, was a short note
in the report of legal proceedings: "Montgomery
Ward and Company yesterday began legal pro­
ceedings to clear the lake front from Randolph
to Madison Streets of the unsightly wooden shan­
ties, structures, garbage, paving blocks and other
refuse piled thereon." He was more specific in his
legal complaint, for he objected to the garbage
scaffolding erected by the city to dump garbage
into Illinois Central railroad cars to be hauled away;
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he sought removal of the right-of-way of eight rail­
road companies and of a warehouse of the American
Express Company.
Why did A. Montgomery Ward and George
Thorne, partners trading as Montgomery Ward and
Company, enter the legal lists in 1890? There had
been earlier law suits concerning the same area
which had been moderately successful. Someone had
stopped the Chicago Baseball Club, which included
Billy Sunday, the famous evangalist, among its play­
ers, from playing professional ball there. The ex­
position hall was demolished according to Harper's
Weekly because of a law suit ordering its removal.
All of this had occurred almost ten years before
Ward became a litigant. The answer may lie in the
"lake front" litigation involving the Illinois Central
Railroad. In the late 1860's, the state legislature had
attempted to give the whole of the lake front area,
including a mile of submerged land in the lake, to
the Illinois Central Railroad for construction of a
great industrial park. The city government and the
civic leaders united in opposition to this "lake front
steal" as it was called, and a great legal battle ensued.
In 1888, the city won the first round against the
Illinois Central Railroad in a decision by Mr. Justice
Harlan of the United States Supreme Court who was
sitting in circuit court. Although this decision was
on appeal to the Supreme Court and was not finally
decided in the city's favor until 1892, after Ward
began his legal battle, the victory in 1 �88 stimulated
newspaper, municipal, and civic interest in the ques­
tion to what use the city should put its lake front
when it finally won. Already the city government
had built a firehouse and temporary armories; it
had granted permission to the Trade and Labor As­
sembly to build a meeting hall in Grant Park; it had
authorized the Logan family to construct a monu­
ment and burial site for General Logan of the Civil
War; it had authorized construction of a temporary
building to house the Democratic national conven­
tion of 1892; and it had granted permission to the
World's Columbian Exposition to construct and
maintain a building for a temporary exhibit of fine
arts for the World's Fair of 1893 and to house the
permanent collection of the Chicago Art Institute.
In the press, every conceivable public use of the area
was proposed except that of an open park. Hetty
Green, the eccentric New York financier and heavy
investor in Chicago real estate, wrote a letter to the
Chicago Tribune urging that the park area be turned
into a great port for merchant ships. Editorially, the
Tribune spoke for armories, museums, and libraries.
Other newspapers spoke for a union station, a city
hall, a police station, post office, and other public
buildings.
Perhaps it was against this background of civic
buildings proposals to fill this narrow area about 400
feet wide and a mile long with buildings that Mont­
gomery Ward decided to champion something else.
He commenced his law suit which the newspapers
described as a suit against unsightliness. Since most
citizens were against unsightliness while champion­
ing their own pet civic projects, no attention was
paid to Montgomery Ward's suit. He was acting as
a good citizen just as the proposers of armories, li­
braries, and museums were.
If the newspapers had bothered to read Ward's
legal pleadings, perhaps they would have been more
upset about the implications of his law suit. Mont­
gomery Ward was not proceeding as a disgruntled
citizen against his government trying to stop the
defendant city from loading garbage in front of his
house. Montgomery Ward claimed that because he
was the owner of two and one-half lots fronting on
Michigan Avenue between Washington Street and
Madison Street, he owned in the public area east of
Michigan Avenue a right of private property, a right
that this area be kept open and unobstructed in order
to provide light, air, and view to the property own­
ers on the west side of Michigan Avenue. True, he
was proceeding only against an unsightly scaffolding
and a railroad warehouse, but if his theory was cor­
rect, Montgomery Ward could stop armories, mu­
seums, city halls, libraries, and, indeed any civic
building supported by the newspapers and other
civic leaders.
Ward's legal theory about his private right was
based on the land title of this part of Chicago. When
Chicago was founded, Fort Dearborn, at the mouth
of the Chicago River, included in its military reserva­
tion that part of Chicago east of State Street, north
of Madison Street, with the river on the north and
the lake on the east. Thus it included part of what
is now Grant Park and it also included the land west
of Michigan Avenue on which was located in 1890
the Montgomery Ward store. The land south of the
military reservation was selected by the Commission­
ers of the Michigan and Illinois Canal in 1836 as part
of the land allocated to Illinois by the United States
to help finance construction of a canal between Lake
Michigan and the Mississippi River. The Commis­
sioners subdivided the selected land east of State
Street, between Madison and 12th Streets, made a
map of it, and began to sell lots in 1836. This 1836
map, as far as appearances are concerned, could
double for the map of almost any subdivision today,
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of a new residential development near any city of
the United States built upon what was once public
domain. The particular feature of this map that is
crucial to the story of Montgomery Ward is the
fact that the map appears to leave unsubdivided or
vacant the land east of a street shown on the map
without an eastern boundary and which was named
on the map "Michigan Avenue." Nothing on the
1836 map indicates why this area was left vacant.
Actually there was not much permanent land east
of Michigan Avenue, for the shoreline changed with
every storm. In the 1880's, a resident of Chicago
testified that he remembered the area in 1836 as
about 400 feet wide at the south end, while at Madi­
son Street, the waters of Lake Michigan lapped Mich­
igan Avenue. On abandonment of Fort Dearborn,
the Secretary of War, disposing of surplus military
property, subdivided in 1839 the area north of Madi­
son Street for sale as lots, and he made his subdivision
conform to that of the Canal Commissioners. This
map, recorded in 1839, showed similar vacant land
east of Michigan Avenue between Madison and Ran­
dolph Streets and additional vacant land west of
Michigan Avenue where the Chicago Public Library
Cultural Center is now situated. This map shows
why the land east of Michigan Avenue was left
vacant, for it carries a notation in the part now oc­
cupied by the cultural center "public ground, for­
ever to remain vacant of building." Sketches in the
sales-promotional literature of the Canal Commis­
sioners indicated that this also was the objective east
of Michigan Avenue. On these quoted words hangs
Montgomery Ward's legal theory.
The lots in both subdivisions fronting Michigan
Avenue were quickly sold and became the site of
the luxurious housing of the major citizens of Chi­
cago. But it was expensive to own land fronting on
Michigan Avenue, and it was expensive for the strug­
gling city to save this land on the lake front. By 1850,
the landowners and the city were practically bank­
rupt from building seawalls to prevent the storms
on Lake Michigan from washing away the avenue
and the residential district. There was talk of aban­
doning the area because of expense but a miracle
came to the city in 1850 in the form of the Illinois
Central Railroad. When the state legislature incor­
porated the railroad and gave it much public land
to finance its development, it provided that the rail­
road could not enter any city without the consent
of that city. The City of Chicago exacted a price
for its consent. It consented to the railroad building
its main line between 12th Street and a proposed
station north of Randolph Street at a distance 400
feet east of Michigan Avenue, on condition that the
railroad erect and maintain, 700 feet east of Michigan
Avenue, on the east line of its right-of-way, "a con­
tinuous stone wall not to exceed the height of Michi­
gan Avenue" of sufficient strength "to protect the
entire front of the city ... from further damage or
injury from the section of the waters of Lake Mich­
igan." The railroad was first built on a trestle out
in Lake Michigan, at some points 300 feet from the
shoreline, and east of its tracks it built a seawall to
protect Chicago. This water area between Michigan
Avenue and the railroad was an unexpected asset
after the great fire of 1871 because it was a place to
dump the fire debris in the rebuilding of Chicago.
By 1890, all of the submerged land west of the tracks
had been filled; the shore of Lake Michigan was
now the seawall of the Illinois Central Railroad on
the eastern side of its tracks.
Montgomery Ward acquired land on the west of
Michigan Avenue just north of Madison Street about
1887, and the company built one of the new type
"skyscrapers" then coming to Chicago. This build­
ing with its unique steam elevators and marble lobby
was the warehouse and office space of the Mont­
gomery Ward company. Ward's customers who
came to Chicago found that they could not buy
there, for it was not a retail store, but they could
sit in a comfortable "Customers' Parlor," read the
catalogue, and rest after weary hours of sight-seeing.
Ward claimed in his law suit that the original pur­
chasers of these lots from the Secretary of War had
relied on the map that showed the area fronting their
properties as forever to be public ground and vacant;
therefore, these original purchasers acquired an ease­
ment of light, air, and unobstructed view to which
Ward succeeded as a purchaser of these lots.
If the newspapers did not see the implications of
this position of Ward, the corporation counsel of
the city did, and he vigorously opposed Ward's legal
theory. In his answer, he asserted that there were
no private rights in the land east of Michigan Ave­
nue, that the city was the absolute owner of this
area, and the city council could use it for whatever
public purposes it wished. He asserted that the open
space shown on the maps merely dedicated land for
public use, and that no private rights were given. He
further claimed that, if there were any private rights
in the area, they were only in the original land and
not in the filled area, and, therefore, since most of
the' activity complained of was on land which was
not in existence in 1836, no objection could be made
by the property owners.
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It was not until 1897 that the Supreme Court of
Illinois decided this case [Chicago v. Ward 169 Ill.
392 48N.E. 927 (1897)] in favor of Montgomery
Ward on his theory that the subdivision plats filed
in the 1830's gave the owners on the west side of
Michigan Avenue rights of private property in the
park west of the railroad tracks. In the meantime, in
1892, the United States Supreme Court had decided
in favor of the city against the claims of the Illinois
Central Railroad so that Chicago civic groups were
busy with plans for use of the lake front. The Chi­
cago Tribune in an editorial on Montgomery Ward's
victory noted that the effect of the decision was to
stop the proposed police station, city hall, board of
education building, municipal power plant, and other
municipal structures. It was undaunted as to its own
pet projects however, for it stated, "It is not likely
that the property owners would object to either an
armory or a museum."
Montgomery Ward himself was undecided about
the Field Museum of Natural History then being
considered for the park area, for he stated to the
press that, "I do not think I would be inclined to
resist its erection." Besides, he had consented to two
civic structures being erected on the open space-the
Chicago Public Library on the space west of Michi­
gan Avenue and the Art Institute under construction
at the time he commenced his law suit in 1890. Even
without Ward's opposition both of these structures
had had legal troubles. At the same time that the city,
with the consent of the property owners, had au­
thorized construction of the public library in the
open space, the state had confused matters by au­
thorizing the Grand Army of the Republic to build
a home on the same site. Apparently, friends of the
library, which had the property owners' consents
(the Grand Army did not), despaired of further
litigation and compromised with the state supported
organization. The result was that the Chicago Public
Library Cultural Center is a unique building: it has
two cornerstones on Michigan Avenue, one at the
south end stating that this cornerstone of the Chi­
cago Public Library was laid in 1893 and one at the
north end stating that the cornerstone of the Grand
Army of the Republic Memorial Hall was also laid
in 1893.
Although Montgomery Ward had consented to
the Art Institute because he thought the people
wanted it, he stated later in life that he had made
a mistake when he had consented to its construction.
Perhaps the subsequent history indicated why he
thought his consent was mistaken. Even though he
consented, the Art Institute became involved in liti­
gation when a Mrs. Sarah Daggett, claiming as a
property owner on Michigan Avenue, attempted to
enjoin its construction. It was discovered that she
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was from New York City, and it was asserted in the
Chicago Journal that she represented "a New York
clique aimed at crippling one department of" the
World's Fair. The matter was settled by Mrs. Dag­
gett's husband signing her name to the consents for
construction. Whether this was done with or with­
out her knowledge does not appear. Thus, the Art
Institute and "all necessary improvements" was ex­
cepted from the injunction issued in Ward's 1890
law suit. But, the original consents were only for a
building with a frontage of no more than 400 feet
from north to south on Michigan Avenue. Even
before Montgomery Ward's death in 1913, several
enlargements of the Art Institute had occurred.
When a property owner finally litigated the matter
in 1929, it was held that the consents included all
necessary enlargements of the Art Institute, but that
the enlargements must not have more than a 400-foot
frontage on Michigan Avenue. Visitors to Chicago
may have noted that "front" on Michigan Avenue
does not mean "seen" from Michigan Avenue but
apparently means a building "facing" on Michigan
Avenue. Additions on the si de streets extend the
building much more than 400 feet from north to
south on Michigan Avenue. But only 400 feet
"fronts" or faces on Michigan Avenue. At least with­
out Montgomery Ward to dispute them, this is what
these consents have come to mean.
All that Montgomery Ward's victory in the Su­
preme Court of Il1inois in 1897 decided was that he
had a private right in the land west of the Il1inois
Central tracks. In 1895, before his first law suit was
decided, the city had extended the boundary of the
park east of the tracks to the harbor line established
by the United States Corps of Engineers, and the
city had granted authority to fill some 1200 feet of
submerged land to this harbor line. In establishing
this new area as a park, the city had excluded a piece
of new land north of Monroe Street for the con­
struction of armories for units of the Illinois Na­
tional Guard. Since the consent of the state was also
needed for this fill of submerged land, the General
Assembly confirmed the extension of the park. It
also then authorized construction of the armories
and changed the name of the whole area from Lake
Park to Grant Park, as it is known today.
The armories were the pet projects of the Chicago
Tribune. From time to time, articles appeared in its
Sunday supplement pointing out that Chicago was
the only world seaport without defense installations
as part of its harbor facilities. Labor disturbances
such as the Pullman strike and the Haymarket riot
were also advanced by civic leaders from time to
time as establishing the need for armories. Whether
they did or did not establish the need for armories,
Montgomery Ward apparently thought they did not
establish the need in Grant Park, and he went into
legal action for the second time. This time his de­
fendants were the board of commissioners of the
lake front armories, and he sought to enjoin con­
struction. Ward's theory was the same as in the
earlier case. The government defense changed how­
ever. It asserted that the United States Supreme
Court had held that the state owned the submerged
lands in trust for the people of the state and that
the authorization of the armory on the newly created
land was carrying out the trust.
In 1902, the Supreme Court of the state again
backed Montgomery Ward [Bliss v. Ward 198 Ill.
104 64 N.E. 705 (1902) J. It held that when the state
consented to the extension of the park east of the
tracks, it did not purport to act inconsistently with
a park but rather to extend the original park to the
east. Therefore, the reclaimed lands east of the Illi­
nois Central track were subject to the same private
rights as the lands to the west of the tracks. In this
manner the armories were stopped.
If the civic leaders of Chicago had not been
greedy, Ward might have stopped with this, his
second victory. He had already indicated that he
was not adverse to the location of the Field Museum
in the park, and he might have formally consented.
During the third litigation, Ward offered to consent
to the museum if the park commissioners would
agree to build nothing else. But the proponents of
use of the park for buildings tried to gain complete
victory. In 1903, the state legislature authorized all
park districts in the state to erect and maintain "mu­
seums and libraries" within any park as part of the
"park facilities." Since the park districts already had
authority to construct "park facilities," this was an
unnecessary grant of power if these were park fa­
cilities. If the park commissioners could construct
any building they wished simply by calling it a
"park facility," Ward had lost his war even though
he had won two battles. In preparation for the ex­
pected law suit, the South Park Commissioners, who
had control of Grant Park, had sent experts to Eu­
rope to prepare documents showing that in Europe
great parks included cultural buildings. Reference
was made in the press to Pittsburgh where a man
named Laird had lost a legal fight against the oc­
cupancy of Schenley Park by the Carnegie Library
because a library was held to be a park facility. The
park commissioners did not stop with a museum.
They proposed to construct the John Crerar Tech-
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nical Library in the park north of the Art Institute;
they proposed to erect a 25-foot boulder as a monu­
ment to Dr. Guthrie, inventor of chloroform. Ac­
cording to Montgomery Ward, the park commis­
sioners had, when Ward commenced his third suit
[Ward v. Field Museum 241 Ill. 496 89 N.E. 731
(1909)] twenty projects for occupancy of Grant
Park, involving buildings which would qualify as
"park buildings."
At this point, the issue of the Field Museum of
Natural History became crucial. Marshall Field
died in 1906 and, in his will, left $8,000,000 to
the Field Museum to erect a suitable building to
house its natural history collection on a site to be
furnished to the museum by the city without cost.
Apparently recognizing that he had an antagonist
in A. Montgomery Ward, Field conditioned his
$8,000,000 gift on the city's providing a site for the
museum within six years of Field's death. Now, if
Ward fought the museum, he might cost the city
$8,000,000. This did not bother Ward, and he
brought his third law suit against the trustees of
the museum and the park commissioners to prevent
them from constructing the museum east of the Illi­
nois Central tracks and immediately south of the Art
Institute.
Newspaper tolerance of Ward's eccentricity (they
really thought he was only against unsightliness)
changed to bitter opposition after the Field gift.
Ward was called "stubborn," "a persistent enemy
of real park buildings," and "undemocratic" because
he would not let the people decide where to locate
the museum. The pressure put upon Ward and his
company must have been tremendous. The Tribune,
for example, reported that "an unidentified man in­
terested in the museum" had suggested that Ward's
customers all over the midwest be asked to write
the company urging Ward to withdraw his Jaw suit
so that "on their visit to Chicago they will be enabled
to visit the museum."
Less "inner-directed" men in the Ward Company
than A. Montgomery Ward wilted under this pres­
sure. Several newspapers reported that "the com­
pany" or the Thornes, his partners, were in favor
of consenting to the museum and that the Thomes
hoped to persuade Ward to consent. Others, men
with whom Ward had associated in other civic af­
fairs, made trips to Georgia, Wisconsin, California,
wherever Ward was, to try to get him to relent. As
each of them returned without Ward's consent, they
gave interviews to the press expressing bitterness at
Ward's recalcitrance. Some of them could not un­
derstand him at all. The president of the trustees of
the Field Museum was quoted as saying "Ward ex­
pressed the belief that it was better to have this great
tract of land as a place for people to go and lie
around on the grass than to make it the pivotal point
of Chicago's scheme of beautifying the city. Yes, he
did actually!"
In this third law suit, the government's defense
took the tack suggested by the 1903 legislation au­
thorizing museums as park facilities. It interpreted
the earlier cases as giving Ward and the other lot
owners a right that there be a park on Michigan
Avenue and, the government lawyers argued, a mu­
seum and a library were park facilities. The Illinois
Supreme Court was unimpressed. It said whether a
museum was a park facility or not was beside the
point because it had never held that Ward's right
was a right to a park. His right was a right to open
space and to an unobstructed view of Lake Michi­
gan. Location of the Field Museum in Grant Park
was stopped.
This third victory for Ward in 1909, only three
years before the deadline on the $8,000,000 gift,
created a civic crisis for friends of the museum,
so much so that Ward felt obliged for the first time
to grant an interview to the press to justify his ac­
tions. He stated that he was not opposed to the
museum and would help raise money to buy a site
for the museum; besides, he thought it should be
located near the University of Chicago. Also, for
the first time, he publicly expressed his plan for the
lake front. The Chicago Daily News quoted him as
saying that he had done Chicago's future generation
a service. "I fought for the poor people of Chicago,
not for the millionaires. Here is a park frontage on
the lake ... which city officials would crowd with
buildings, transforming the breathing spot for the
poor into a show ground of the educated rich."
In the next and final round of the Ward legal war
with the civic leaders, the museum officials and the
park commissioners decided to take the offensive
and save the Field Museum for the lake front area.
Under the statute authorizing park districts to build
museums and libraries, the district was given power
to condemn private property for these purposes. The
park commissioners accordingly brought a condem­
nation suit against Montgomery Ward, representing
the property owners in the Fort Dearborn addition
to Chicago, and against Levi Mayer, a prominent
Chicago lawyer, representing the property owners
in the Canal Commissioners addition [South Park
Commissioners v. Montgomery Ward & Company
248 Ill. 299 93N.E. 910 (1910)]. It sought to con­
demn the private rights which these property own-
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ers asserted in Grant Park. Montgomery Ward won
again in 1911, but for the first time the Supreme
Court was not unanimous in supporting him. A
majority of four said that if an owner dedicates his
land to a particular public use, here an open space,
government cannot change that use even by use of
the condemnation power. The minority of three as­
serted that condemnation is a sovereign power,
whereby government recognizes the right of private
property and seeks to acquire those rights upon pay­
ment of compensation. Of the four Montgomery
Ward law suits this is the only one which he won
on what is today (if not then) a dubious point of
law.
As any person who has seen Chicago knows, the
Field Museum was ultimately located on the lake
front but not in the area subject to Montgomery
Ward's private rights. It is located on reclaimed land
south of Roosevelt Road where the land is not sub­
ject to the plats filed in 1836 and 1839.
Thus, in 1911, after 20 years litigation and ex­
penditure of an estimated $50,000, Montgomery
Ward had successfully prevented all of the civic
projects for buildings in Grant Park. He had done
this in spite of the almost unanimous opposition of
the newspapers and civic leaders of Chicago. With
no public opinion surveys in those decades, we can
only guess what the citizenry thought. However,
shortly before Montgomery Ward died in 19l3, vin­
dication came. Frederic A. Delano, then president
of the Wabash Railroad and, later, on appointment
from his nephew, Franklin D. Roosevelt, chairman
of the National Capital Planning Commission, speak­
ing before the Chicago City Plan Commission said:
"Many of us once felt that the fight of Mr. Ward
was selfish. We now recognize that it was wise. Had
he not made it, a string of fire engine houses, police
stations, post offices, and other buildings would now
cut off all view of the lake from Michigan Avenue.
Mr . Ward winked his eye once, in the case of the
Art Institute, and it would have been better had he
not done so."
After Ward's death, others endeavored to succeed
to Ward's mantle as "watchdog" of the lake front,
but they have generally failed in court. An objecting
taxpayer or citizen has little standing to thwart the
will of the majority as expressed in the legislative
halls. But Ward had demonstrated that a single own­
er of private property could protect old and new
land which was part of the park. However, an owner
of land on Michigan Avenue learned in the 1920's
from the Illinois Supreme Court that if a private
yacht club (the Chicago Yacht Club) could obtain
permission from the Secretary of War and the State
of Illinois to fill an island area not part of the park,
it could build on this "island" even though the park
commissioners permitted the island to be connected
with the park by a driveway. The way would now
appear open to defeat the expansiveness of the Grant
Park area, if the citizens are so inclined, by building
on reclaimed land adjacent to the park but not made
a legal part of it.
Why did Mr. Ward fight his friends and associ­
ates? He made no attempt to explain himself publicly
until after his third law suit, almost 20 years after
he started litigation. To some, this explanation could
be an after-the-fact rationalization after he had been
so severely criticized for his position on the Field
Museum. To others, this could mean only that the
press finally forced him to break his policy of silence
and privacy. During the bitter feud, newspapers fre­
quently speculated as to his motives. When asked if
he knew why Ward opposed the Field Museum,
its president would say to reporters: "I do not know.
Mr. Ward was once a clerk in the Field store."
We can conclude that A. Montgomery Ward
must have felt strongly about the lake front. All
other known facets of his life point to a man who
hated publicity. While he gave lavishly for charitable
purposes, he never allowed his name to be used in
connection with a public charity; he endowed hos­
pital beds under assumed names, and many of his
larger benefactions were not known until after his
death. He seldom granted newspaper interviews, and
he refused permission to be written up in numerous
sketches of Chicago's leaders or wealthy men.
Though he so hated publicity, his feelings about the
lake front were strong enough to make him begin
a law suit and pay the inevitable price of public
glare, and, in his case, even bitterness. Once he
starred his litigation in 1890, there was not a year
until his death in 1913 when he was not in the public
press as "watchdog" of the lake front.
Those who really want to know Mr. Ward's mo­
tives will have to await psychoanalysis of his letters
and papers. Perhaps the really important point of
this story is that we do not need to know why he
acted as he did, whether from stubbornness, selfish­
ness, irrationality, or vindictiveness, as his enemies
suggested, or altruism and a dream of the future
needs of Chicago's workers, as he himself suggested.
The result of Ward's private decision about use of
private property rights was public good-the great
open space in the heart of commercial Chicago. •
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*Comments
Last summer, my predecessor's zest for scholarshipand law reform led him to develop an elaborate
plan. At least in retrospect, it seems clear what his
goal was-a return to teaching, scholarship, and mis­
sionary work. He went about accomplishing this
goal by first yielding to the entreaties of the ad­
ministration in Washington to let them put forward
his name for a high position in the Justice Depart­
ment. Then he alerted the National Rifle Association
that he had written an interesting little book which
they might like to take issue with. The rest was, at
least in the world of congressional politics, a fore­
gone conclusion.
Of course, the success of Norval Morris' scheme
depended on the convening of a search committee
for a new dean. Such a committee was ready to ad­
vise the President of the University sometime late
in the summer. There is only one other fact you
need to know to comprehend the outcome. I was the
only faculty member who was out of the country
and, indeed, incommunicado during the crucial
period.
Norval Morris has been a superb and energetic
dean. I follow him with great trepidation. We all
know how strongly Norval believes that the Law
School is made up of more than the present popula­
tion of the Laird Bell Quadrangle, be they students
01' faculty and staff. As dean, he loved working with
the graduates and friends of the School. I am con­
fident I may speak for these graduates and friends
when I say that we are most appreciative of the tire­
less manner in which he reminded all of us that the
Law School is a community reaching far beyond the
Midway.
* Remarks of Dean Gerhard Casper at the Annual Dinner of
the University of Chicago Law School Alumni Association,
April 19, 1979.
That as the new dean of the Law School, I should
have mostly sleepless nights goes without saying. It
is indeed part of the job description. In this respect,
as in many others, the deanship is very much like
the chieftaincy of the Tshidi, a South African tribe
about which I read an anthropological paper the
other night. At a public meeting, a headman de­
scribed the chieftaincy in the following terms:
A chief is the herdsman of the tribe. If he
guides us well, we will be prosperous. Rain will
be plentiful. ... [The chief] asks for our advice
and decides what to do. A chief never sleeps....
It is our custom that a chief is like a rubbish
dump. Anything can be brought to him and he
must listen.
These quotations were from the first paragraph of
a speech. In the second paragraph, the speaker goes
on to severely criticize the chief. There, too, some
of you may find analogies. Addressing the incumbent
directly, the headman said: "You do not even go to
church as you used to. You have had the best edu­
cation, and yet you have nothing to show. Improve­
ment ceased when your father died."
The task is awesome, not simply because of the
problems but also because of the accomplishments
of prior deans. Among recently chosen deans of
major law schools, I have the particular honor and
joyous burden of having the most distinguished line
of "fathers" to cope with-to cope with not just in
the abstract but, as it were, in the flesh because of
the presence of three of them on campus-Edward
Levi, Phil Neal, and Norval Morris. When an article
in one of those well-informed Chicago newspapers
recently referred to Edward Levi as the Dean of
the University of Chicago Law School, I dropped
Edward a note asking him if he knew something I
did not know. He responded with one of those typi-
19
cal Levi statements which were the delight of the
press when he was the Attorney General of the
United States-unambiguous, crystal clear, leaving no
room for further questions. I quote: "If I did, it
would only be fair."
It is a very great honor to be chosen as the dean
of this law school. This statement would be true for
any person so chosen. It is particularly true in my
case, given my background and my accent which,
while a slight improvement on Norval's, still is a
rather peculiar one for an American law school
dean to have. In 1966, I came to Chicago from Cali­
fornia-and before that, Germany-persuaded by Phil
Neal that Chicago, the University of Chicago, and
the Law School were great centers of serious pro­
fessionalism and scholarly activity. "Robust, unin­
hibited, and wide open," in short, nonparochial, are
proper adjectives to describe the School and its grad­
uates. While I do not want to appear immodest, I
think it is proper to invoke the name of Ernst Freund
(who also came from Germany after having first
been educated in German law schools) to suggest
how nonparochial the University and the Law School
have been from their very beginnings when Presi­
dent Harper chose Freund to be, in Felix Frank­
furter's words, "the father of the Law School." Alas,
I have never been able to find out whether Freund
spoke with a German accent. Even a slight one
would give me great comfort.
President Harper, prior to meeting Freund, seri-
ously considered the notion of an institute for legal
research rather than a law school. In 1932, reflecting
on this issue, Professor Freund restated the position
he had taken vis-a-vis Harper. I quote: "To my ques­
tion: Is jurisprudence something better than law?
Is scientific law different from professional law?
Should scientific law be merged in the social sci­
ences? I suggest a demurrer rather than an answer.
I do think that if we had established a school of
jurisprudence we should have been disappointed in
our expectations."
I think it is accurate to say that the same questions
which troubled Harper and Freund more than seven­
ty-five years ago are still concerning us. Indeed, we
are seeing an effort to push the best law schools
beyond the high level of scholarly orientation which
they have achieved in recent decades to new fron­
tiers. If a label is needed, I would call it "neolegal
realism." The distinguished dean of a distinguished
law school recently referred to this as perhaps the
most exciting time for academic law since the end
of the second World War. My colleague said ap­
provingly, and I quote: "Academic lawyers today
are concerned with the appropriate limits of law and
with the interrelationship between procedural mat­
ters-in the large sense of that term-and substantive
and distributive justice. Relative to his predecessor,
today's young academic is enormously sophisticated
in humanistic and social science studies."
I hate to be a spoilsport but, just as Ernst Freund
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did earlier, I should like to suggest a demurrer.
There is no doubt in my mind that we should be
interdisciplinary, though interdisciplinary work car­
ries with it not only the promise of additional light
shed but, in the absence of modesty, the danger of
amateurishness in other disciplines. There is also no
doubt in my mind that law schools should be con­
cerned with what nowadays is referred to as "pol­
icy," and what more old-fashioned people like my­
self might call "justice" or "values." We should be
willing to call a spade a spade, and, in particular, an
injustice an injustice. But let us be clear about two
constraints. First, individually and collectively, law­
yers should be very skeptical about their ability to
understand truth and justice better than the next
man. Second, when we speak about the law of the
land, we should state it as fairly as we can. Law as
a science is an elusive matter, but the scientific spirit
calls first of all for extreme fidelity to facts and cir­
cumstances, especially when we set out to engage
in broad and tall generalizations.
In part, my remarks are triggered by my concern
about recent speculative writings by law professors,
many of whom relentlessly attempt to impose on
the law their own policy preferences while losing
sight of what the truth of the matter is. I am re­
ferring especially to that area of law which I know
something about, that is, Constitutional law. There
are, God knows, enough ambiguities in the Constitu­
tion for us to help it develop in what we view as
the right direction. But let us be fair and clear about
where our own preferences come into play. Neither
law nor its history can be infinitely manipulated to
suit our own views.
You may find it curious, given my German back­
ground and my long-standing interest in political
science and interdisciplinary work, that I should
warn against excessive doses of speculative scholar­
ship. It is precisely because of this background that
I am especially sensitive to the pitfalls. Indeed, I
have fallen into a great number of pits myself. Also,
as dean of this law school, I can speak from a posi­
tion of strength, as we have pioneered in the inte­
gration of legal studies with other intellectual dis­
ciplines while maintaining the most rigorous stan­
dards of professional training. In this, I have no
doubt, we are less unique than we sometimes flatter
ourselves to be. But because of it, we share with
other law schools of a scholarly orientation the re­
sponsibility to protect legal education. We must pro­
tect legal education not only against the mindless
efforts of certain elements of the bar which want
to return us to the status of trade schools but also
against the danger that legal education might lose
its moorings in the law of the land and the profession
for which it educates its students.
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Wilber G. Katz
Harry Kalven, Jr. *
Wilber G. Katz, Dean of the Law School from 1939
to 1950, and a faculty member for over thirty years,
died on May 17, 1979, in Milwaukee. Harry Kalven,
Jr., one of Mr. Katz' students at the Law School,
upon Mr. Katz' retirement from the teaching of law,
wrote a moving tribute originally published in the
Wisconsin Law Review. In honor of Mr. Katz, we
reprint this tribute, which is unsurpassed in freshness,
charm, and loving admiration.-The Editor
Wilber Katz was a member of the faculty forover 30 years and was Dean of the University
of Chicago Law School from 1939 to 1950. It was
a crucial time of transition for the school as it moved
,
from a period of orthodoxy typified by such leg-
endary names as Mechem, Hall, Freund, Bigelow,
and Bogert into a position of leadership among con­
temporary schools. Wilber had with him a remark­
able group of men-Edward Levi, Malcolm Sharp,
Charlie Gregory, Sheldon Tefft, Max Rheinstein,
William Crosskev, Fritz Kessler, Henry Simons, and,
a bit later, Aaron Director and Roscoe Steffen-re­
markable, I think, even when one makes discounts
for nostalgia. It was, under the stimulus of Robert
Maynard Hutchins, a period of fresh and radical
rethinking of the purpose and style of legal educa­
tion with experiments in a four-year curriculum and
comprehensive year-long sequences; introduction of
training in accounting, economics, and psychology;
and implementation of a serious individual tutorial
program in legal writing and research for the fresh­
man year and industry studies for the senior year.
It was a time of steady, excited reflection and experi-
• Mr. Kalven,)D 1938, was The Harry A. Bigelow Professor
of Law at The University of Chicago and taught at the Law
School until his death in 1974. This tribute is adapted from
the Winter, 1973, issue of the Wisconsin Law Review, which
was dedicated to Wilber Katz. Adapted with permission.
mentation by the faculty. Of course, such experi­
mentation was destined to be not altogther success­
ful, but it served to give the school its intellectual
trademark-a professional home of liberal education
in the law. The history and evaluation of that mo­
ment of ferment in legal education has yet to be
written, and it is difficult indeed to bestow individual
credits given the affection and admiration one has
for that whole group who generated an environment
of excitement, serious purpose, warmth, and grace;
but I think that Wilber Katz was clearly the prin­
cipal architect.
In a unique and wonderful manner, Wilber Katz
combined firmness with extraordinary gentleness,
high purpose with grace and wit, professionalism
with an amateur's spontaneity and curiosity, and
anxiety with poise. As a teacher and a friend, he was
always serious enough and concerned enough to pay
one the compliment of criticism, a gentle but firm
corrector of one's flaws.
I am bemused by sudden memories of odd frag­
ments of conversation and gentle, modest anecdotes
such as his delighted disclosure at one early point
in our friendship that little children often had trou­
ble with his name and ended up with "Wibbler." It
was a disclosure that was to mark me for life; even
now when I go to use his name I have to think twice.
Years ago, he was appointed by the United States
Supreme Court to argue a postconviction appeal un­
der the then notoriously complex, frustrating, and
impenetrable Illinois procedures. Wilber was so of­
fended by the stance of the lawyer representing the
state, who had expended great ingenuity and skill in
defending the wretched scheme (an example, I sup­
pose, of a lawyer devoting his selfless best to his
client's cause), that he declined to meet with him for
a friendly breakfast on the morning before the argu­
ment. Then there is an episode which rises to mind
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every time I face the ordeal of marking blue books,
an ordeal especially painful for Wilber: to moderate
the sense of burden that a large pile of unmarked
exams always gave him, he hit upon the stratagem of
dividing them into small piles and hiding them
around the house so that at any moment he could
look around and he could deceive himself into think­
ing he was almost through. The stratagem was a
great success psychologically until the day came
when he could not remember where he had hidden
the last pile! There was his long and determined ef­
fort to get interested in baseball. He had been baffled
and then intrigued by the fact that two of his ap­
parently rational students and friends, Walter Blum
and I, invested such serious attention in the matter.
But after going to several games, reading the sports
pages dutifully, and listening to us talk some more,
he concluded that baseball was a peculiar cultural
taste that one had to begin to develop when one was
much younger than he. There was the Law Review
dinner my last year at school. Wilber had almost
single-handedly brought a Law Review into exist­
ence at Chicago a few years before and had been
unstinting in his help on its behalf. He was preparing
a set of remarks from the vantage point of the father
of the Review, playing over in his mind various
changes on that theme, when I, borrowing a maxim
from my mother, chanced to introduce him as "the
Review's best friend and severest critic, our Mother
Katz." There were the marvelous marionette shows
that the Katzes, thanks to Ruth's artistic gifts, used
to put on at their home with Wilber busily pulling
the strings and somehow supplying the voices for a
dozen different characters. Perhaps lost to culture
forever now is one especially memorable show, a
take-off of a University of Chicago Roundtable,
which had a script written by Edward Levi, then a
student, and which featured a puppet named Morti­
mer J. Adler. Ruth had, at one point, made a puppet
of Wilber, and he was fond of telling that whenever
he slipped into pomposity or vanity, he would be
given a gentle reminder the next day and find his
puppet sitting in his big arm chair.
Above all, Wilber Katz was a teacher. It was the
clear consensus of the student body when I was at
school that he was the "hot" teacher, the real focus
of classroom excitement; the taste for him was shared
equally by the students who approached law study
with philosophic yearnings as by those who had
already developed a firm taste for the more worldly
aspects of careers in law. The passage of time and
the accumulation of experience at law teaching have
supplied distance now to those youthful judgments.
The verdict still stands; he was simply the best teach­
er I ever experienced. He exuded the quick intel­
lectual brightness and taste for logic that law schools
have always prized; he carried rigor and authority
in the classroom; but his teaching, even of a large
law class, was like a conversation with a friend-it
had an endearing quality because he almost never,
in his excitement over what he was discussing, com­
pleted a sentence! He was effortlessly polite and
gentle and shunned any use of the power to bully
which had been so much a part of the older case
method teaching tradition. He taught always like a
man seized with an idea. And he made law proper
exciting. I recall now with a touch of awe that his
teaching of the statutory scheme regulating prefer­
ences under the Bankruptcy Act alchemized it into
a splendid subject matter for intellectual analysis.
And finally, he was interstitially, but only interstitial­
ly, philosophical. The stuff of his classes, to borrow
Llewellyn's phrase, was law stuff, but it was inter­
woven with hints of larger themes.
There was a second characteristic of his teaching
that impresses me now as I look back. He had a firm
sense of the architecture of a course and of the
teaching responsibility for it. The plot of his courses
always emerged with clarity from the sequence of
individual class sessions. He steadily counteracted the
myopia that the case method can engender. You may
not have been able each day to know exactly where
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the class was on his secret map, but you inevitably
emerged from his courses with a firm sense of where
you had been.
He was very good whatever the field; he was
splended when he taught from a congenially subtle
pattern as with his bankruptcy course and Roscoe
Steffen's great casebook. But he was at his utter best
in his own course in corporations, for which he had
developed his own set of teaching materials and into
which he had built, really as a pioneer, a substantial
dose of accounting. I have classmates who went on
to distinguished careers at the corporate bar who
swear to this day that Wilber's materials were and
remained their bible for years after they left law
school, so well had he met the teacher's responsibility
for detecting the structure of a field of law. One can
only regret that in his modesty and nonexhibitionism,
he never sought to publish his corporation materials,
although they stick in my mind-and it is now 35
years-as the very model of a casebook. I:
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Max Rheinstein's Collected Works Published
Adolph Sprudzs*
Edited by Professor Dr.- Hans G. Leser (MCL '59from the University of Chicago) of the Universi­
ty of Marburg, the two volumes of Max Rheinstein's
Gesammelte Schriften - Collected Works were pub­
lished in June 1979 by j.C.B. Mohr in Tuebingen.
Comprising more than one thousand pages, the
Collected Works bring together 52 of the most im­
portant essays of the late Professor Rheinstein, previ­
ously scattered in numerous publications and not
easily accessible. The selection and systematization
of the included publications were accomplished over
a period of years with the active participation and
support of the author himself, who gave his approval
to the final version of the project in Munich just a
few days before his death.
Arranged by the editor according to Rheinstein's
main fields of research interests, the included publi­
cations appear under the chapter headings of "Juris­
prudence and Sociology," "Comparative Law and
Common Law (USA)," "Conflict of Laws," and
"Family Law." Two literary essays and a bibliogra­
phy of Max Rheinstein's writings, consisting of 413
individual titles, conclude the work. Most of the in­
cluded items are contributions to Festscbrijten or
collections of essays, articles in periodicals, and arti­
cle-length book reviews; the great majority (43) of
these are in English, the rest in German. A brief
"Editor's Introduction" devotes a few pages to Max
Rheinstein's career and accomplishments, explains
the arrangement of material included, and concludes
with the editor's personal thanks to those who helped
in making the appearance of these volumes possible.
The publication of Max Rheinstein's Collected
• Foreign Law Librarian and Lecturer of Legal Bibliography.
Works is an event of great interest to his many
former students, friends, and admirers on all con­
tinents as well as to the legal profession at large. The
editor and publisher are to be congratulated on their
tenacity and perseverance in overcoming all difficul­
ties and on the quality of the final product. •
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Memoranda
Gifts of Art to the Law School
The Law School has received two major additions
to its art collection.
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph R. Shapiro, who have made
numerous gifts to the University, have given the Law
School over 50 prints of major twentieth century
art. The prints, handsomely matted and framed, are
now hanging in the lower level corridor as well as
in the Library staircases and add a warm and color­
ful note to those areas.
Mr. and Mrs. Dino D'Angelo (he is a 1944 grad­
uate of the Law School) have given a major work
of art by the British sculptor Kenneth Armitage. It
is a bronze statue entitled Diarchy and is now per­
manently installed on the lawn at the west end of the
pool. This important work is the first of two copies
which were cast. The second is in the collection of
the Tate Gallery in London.
Volunteering at the Law School
Irving T. Zemans (JD '29) has made a splendid gift
to the Law School. After practicing law in Chicago
for fifty years, Toby has 'volunteered his services
to the school as Building Coordinator. Three days
a week, he devotes all of his time ensuring that the
building custodians, engineers, and groundskeepers
have the place working for use by staff, students,
and faculty. It is a thankless job that Toby fills with
humor, courtesy, and grace.
Prizes Awarded to Students
The following awards were made to students during
the 1978-79 academic year:
To Michael Shortley, III, and Paul S. Fisher, the
Karl Llewellyn Memorial Cup for excellence in brief
writing and oral argument in the Moot Court Com­
petition at the Law School.
To Rex Browning and Steven A. Marenberg, the
Hinton Moot Court Competition Awards as winners
of the 1978-79 Moot Court Competition.
To Emile Karafiol, the George Gleason Bogert
Trust Prize made to the student with the best aca­
demic performance in the course in which Trusts is
taught.
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James T. Gibson, Associate Dean for Administration and
Development
To Robert E. Shapiro and John B. Berrenger, the
Isaiah S. Dorfman Prize for outstanding work in
Labor Law.
To Ruth B. Kleinman, the Ann Barber Outstand­
ing Service Award for her contributions to the qual­
ity of life at the Law School.
The Deaths of Two Noted Alumni
Jerome S. Weiss (Ph.B. 1928, J.D. 1930, Order of
the Coif) died suddenly on September 11, 1979. Mr.
Weiss, a senior partner at Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath
and Rosenthal, was chairing the 50th reunion effort
of his Law School class at the time of his death.
Throughout his life, Jerome S. Weiss was a loyal
and active supporter of the Law School. Mr. Weiss
served as Chairman of the 1959 Fund Drive, Presi­
dent of the Alumni Association from 1961-64, and
on the Visiting Committee from 1969-72. He was
a Director of the Alumni Association since 1950 and
a member of the Development Council since 1970.
Russell Baker (Ph.B. 1923, J.D. 1925), founder
and senior partner of Baker and McKenzie, died
September 28, 1979. Mr. Baker was a member of the
Special Gifts Committee for the 1963 campaign, a
member of the Citizens' Board, and a founding mem­
ber of the Law School Recruitment Program.
The loss of these fine lawyers and exceptional
people has saddened the Law School.
Law School Obtains Grant from Thyssen
Foundation
The Thyssen Foundation of Cologne, Germany, has
awarded the Law School a $115,000 grant. The grant
enables the Law School to invite senior scholars as
well as students for purposes of research. teaching,
and study. It is also designated for Law School re­
search in the Federal Republic. Judge Hans Rupp,
who recently retired from the Federal Constitutional
Court in Karlsruhe, was the first Thyssen Founda­
tion Visiting Professor during the Spring Quarter,
1979. The grant also supported Professor Richard
Epstein, of the Law Faculty, for research at the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law
in Hamburg this past summer. Mr. Wolfgang Witz,
of the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, who is
currently enrolled as a graduate student at the Law
School, has received a tuition scholarship from the
grant.
New Appointments to Faculty and Staff
Ms. Lea Brilmay er has been appointed Assistant Pro­
fessor. Prior to her appointment, Ms. Brilmayer was
an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
Texas. She received her J.D. and her undergraduate
degree from University of California, Berkeley. Ms.
Brilmayer subsequently obtained an L.L.M. from
Columbia University. Her areas of interest include
law and statistics, jurisprudence, and conflicts of
laws.
James T. Gibson, Jr., was appointed Associate
Dean for Administration and Development. A 1952
graduate of the Law School, Mr. Gibson also re­
ceived his undergraduate degree (Ph.B. 1948) from
the University of Chicago. For nineteen years prior
to his retirement in early 1978 as vice-president, Mr.
Gibson was employed by International Minerals
Chemical Corporation. Before joining IMC, Mr.
Gibson practiced law with the firm of Gould &
Ratner in Chicago.
Ms. Holly Davis was appointed Assistant Dean for
Alumni Relations and Development. After receiving
her BA from Michigan State University, Ms. Davis
attended the University of Chicago Law School
from which she graduated in 1976. Ms. Davis' most
recent position was with the Continental Illinois Na­
tional Bank and Trust Company.
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Ms. Edna Epstein has been appointed Lecturer in
Law. Ms. Epstein, a 1973 Cum Laude graduate of
the Law School, is in private practice with the Chi­
cago firm of Sidley and Austin. Ms. Epstein will
teach a seminar in trial practice Winter and Spring
Quarters.
Visiting Faculty
Dennis W. Carlton, a member of the faculty of the
Economics Department at the University of Chicago,
is a visiting faculty member and Law and Economics
Fellow for Fall and Winter terms. He is teaching
Economic Analysis Fall term. Mr. Carlton's areas of
special interest are industrial organization, especially
market behavior under uncertainty, and incentives
for and consequences of the use of long-term con­
tracts.
Peter Martin, a Professor at Cornell Law School,
will serve as a Visiting Professor. He will teach the
first year property course as well as welfare law and
a seminar on social security law.
Mr. Brian Simpson will return to the Law School
for Spring Quarter to teach a course in legal history.
Mr. Simpson, a noted legal historian, is the occupant
of a Chair at the University of Kent at Canterbury.
Stephen Williams, a Law and Economic Fellow
as well as a Visiting Professor for the 1979-80 school
year, is a Professor of Law at the University of
Colorado. His interests are property, environmental
law, and oil and gas law.
Two Clinical Fetlows Appointed
Stefan H. Krieger and Amy Hilsman have been ap­
pointed Fellows at the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic.
Stefan H. Krieger is a 1975 graduate (with hon­
ors, Order of the Coif) of the University of Illinois
College of Law. While attending law school, Mr.
Krieger served as Managing Editor of the University
of Illinois Law Forum. After graduation, Mr. Krie­
ger clerked for Judge Hubert L. Will, Federal Dis­
trict Judge, Northern District of Illinois. After his
clerkship, Mr. Krieger was employed by the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago.
Amy Hilsman is a 1977 graduate of the University
of Chicago Law School. She obtained her under­
graduate degree as well (B.A. 1973) from the Uni­
versity, After graduation from law school, Ms. Hils­
man clerked for Bernard M. Decker, United States
District Court, Northern District of Illinois. Her
areas of specialization include welfare and social se­
curity law.
Bigelow Teaching Fetlows
There are six Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellows
at the Law School this year. The Fellows' primary
responsibility is to design and implement the legal
research and writing program for first-year students.
Professor Geoffrey Stone will coordinate the pro­
gram this year.
The Fellows are:
Claudia G. Allen, a graduate of the State Univer­
sity of New York at Buffalo, having received her
B.A., M.A., and J.D. degrees from that institution,
the latter awarded in May of 1979. In law school,
she served on the editorial board of the Buffalo Law
Review and as a teaching assistant in the Legal Re­
search and Writing Program. Between 1970 and
1976, Ms. Allen was employed as an art instructor
in the Depew Public Schools. Since 1977, she has
been a law clerk in the Buffalo firm of Magavern,
Magavern, Lowe, Beilwech and Dopkins.
A 1970 graduate of Bradley University, C. Peter
Erlinder studied at the Georgetown University Law
Center until 1972 when he left to manage a business.
He resumed his law study at Chicago-Kent College
of Law in 1977, receiving his J.D. degree this year.
While at Chicago-Kent, he placed first in the Moot
Court Competition, served on the Law Review, and
worked as a teaching assistant in the Legal Writing
Program.
Debra M. Evenson received her law degree from
Rutgers in 1976 and has been working as an associate
in the New York law firm of Willkie Farr & Gal­
lagher since graduation. While in law school, she
served on the editorial board of the Rutgers Law
Review. A 1964 graduate of Barnard College, Ms.
Evenson has done work toward a Master's degree
in urban planning at Columbia University. She has
worked as a research associate at the Russell Sage
Foundation, as a consultant to the Trans Urban East
Organization in New York City, and as a research
analyst at the Columbia University School of Social
Work.
David F. Graham is a 1978 graduate of this Law
School, where he was a Llewellyn Cup Finalist and
a member of the Hinton Moot Court Committee. He
received his B.A. degree in 1975 from Haverford
College, graduating with high honors in political sci­
ence and philosophy. Since his graduation from law
school, Mr. Graham has been clerking for Justice
Charles Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court.
Rayman L. Solomon is also a graduate of the Law
School (J.D. '76). Mr. Solomon received his B.A.
degree at Wesleyan University in 1968, did grad­
uate work in American history at Memphis State
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University, and in 1972 was awarded the M.A. de­
gree in history by the University of Chicago. He is
presently a Ph.D. candidate in American legal his­
tory. Since his graduation from law school, Mr.
Solomon has been Director of the History Project
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit, and this past year served as law clerk to Judge
George C. Edwards of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Jane M. Wieber received her B.S. degree from
Iowa State University in 1971. She served from 1971-
73 as a VISTA Volunteer assigned to the Wichita,
Kansas, Legal Aid Society. Ms. Whicher graduated
with high distinction in 1976 from the University
of Iowa College of Law and has been employed since
graduation as an associate in the litigation depart­
ment of the Kansas City law firm of Morrison,
Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish.
Kenneth W. Dam, Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor
in International Legal Studies
Faculty and Staff Notes
U7alter]. Blum, Wilson-Dickenson Professor of Law,
was elected to the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences.
Gerhard Casper, Dean and Max Pam Professor of
American and Foreign Law, testified on constitu­
tional requirements for amending the United States
Constitution before the California Assembly Ways
and Means Committee in February. In April, he
participated in the Conference on Comparative Anal­
ysis of Constitutional Law sponsored by the Center
for Study of the American Experience and the Law
Center of the University of South California in Los
Angeles. Mr. Casper was a member of the faculty
of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies for
the session on American Law and Legal Institutions.
In August, he was elected to the Board of Directors
of the American Bar Foundation.
Kenneth W. Dam, Harold J. and Marion F. Green
Professor in International Legal Studies, is the co­
author of Energy: The Next Twenty Years. The
book is a report of a study group sponsored by the
Ford Foundation. In a forward, McGeorge Bundy
wrote, "The central message of the present report
is that energy-expensive today-is likely to be more
expensive tomorrow and that society as a whole will
gain from a resolute effort to make the price the
user pays for energy, and for saving energy, reflect
its true value."
Spencer L. Kimball, Seymour Logan Professor of
Law, has agreed to continue as Executive Director
of the American Bar Foundation after having ten­
dered his resignation to become effective last year.
This year, he has published a strong criticism of the
United States Supreme Court decision in City of Los
Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Man­
hart in the 1979 volume, no. 1 of the American Bar
Foundation Research Journal, under the title "Re­
verse Sex Discrimination: Manhart."
Bernard D. Meltzer, James Parker Hall Professor of Law
Professor Edmund W. Kitch and ClaraAnn Bow­
ler, Research Project Specialist, Law and Economics
Program, published a study of the political and eco­
nomic background of Munn v. Illinois in the 1978
Supreme Court Review. The second edition of Legal
Regulation of the Competitive Process, a Foundation
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Press casebook on unfair competltlon, trademarks,
copyrights, and patents was published this past sum­
mer. The book is written and edited by Professor
Kitch and Professor Harvey Perlman of the Uni­
versity of Virginia, a former Bigelow Fellow.
Professor William Landes presented a paper en­
titled "Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the
Diversity Jurisdiction" (with Professor Richard Pos­
ner) at the Research Conference on Public Policy
and Management in Chicago in October. He has
also presented a paper entitled "Rescue at Sea: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Salvage
Awards" (with Richard Posner) and participated in
the National Science Foundation-National Bureau
of Economic Research Conference on Law and
Economics.
Professor John H. Langbein's William Crosskey
Lecture in Legal History, "Torture and Plea Bar­
gaining," previously published in the Fall 1978 edi­
tion of the University of Chicago Law Review, will
be published in The Public Interest Magazine, winter
1980 issue. Mr. Langbein participated in a panel of
Chicago judges and practicing attorneys which met
to further discuss his Crosskey Lecture.
Assistant Professor Douglas Laycock discussed
school busing at a joint meeting of the Los Angeles
alumni associations of The University of Chicago,
Harvard, and Yale law schools. He is serving on
the Advisory Board of the Consumer Services Or­
ganization, a nonprofit corporation offering a pre­
paid legal services plan in Chicago. Professor Lay­
cock is also serving as Faculty Coordinator of the
Chicago Law Student Public Interest Intern Pro­
gram. In summer, 1979, the program placed twenty­
one law students, including six University of Chicago
students, in internships with seven public interest
agencies in Chicago. The program is funded by Chi­
cago philanthropists. He continues to serve as faculty
advisor to the student legal ethics program, a series
of quarterly seminars on legal ethics organized by
an informal student committee and financially sup­
ported by Calvert House, the Catholic Student Cen­
ter adjacent to the University.
The manuscript from James Parker Hall Professor
of Law, Bernard D. Meltzer's 1979 supplement to
Labor Law: Cases, Materials and Problems (2nd ed,
1977), will be published by Little Brown and Com­
pany in 1979.
Professor John H. Langbein
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Dear Graduates and Friends:
The Law School continues to flourish, as it has in the past, as part of one of the most distinguished
universities in the world. Its preeminence in teaching and professional training, in research and clinical
activities, has had a long tradition. You are part of this tradition. The many graduates and friends who have
helped us have participated in an important endeavor. The School is fortunate that it has always been able
to call on you to an extent which is unique.
The 1978 Fund Drive raised half a million dollars in unrestricted expendable funds. This is approximately
the same amount as was donated in 1977. In addition, we received significant restricted contributions. This
support encourages and enables the School to perform its many tasks. Nevertheless, I hope the 1979
Fund Drive will do better. Not only did the Fund not keep up with inflation, but we failed to come close to
coping with extraordinary cost rises in such areas as library acquisitions. In addition, I am concerned about
our long-term ability not only to maintain but to strengthen and increase what I think is the most productive
law faculty in the country. We must also continue to attract one of the finest groups of students.
We are extremely grateful to all who have helped us to meet the challenge. This year, I urge you
to increase your contribution. I believe that the Law School renders an important service to the legal
profession. This tradition can be maintained only through greater participation of our graduates and friends.
Sincerely,
{je, t;:�d casq-r�
Dean
The Law School
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